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THE FALLACY OF CONSENT: SHOULD ARBITRATION BE A
CREATURE OF CONTRACT?
Fabio Núñez del Prado*
ABSTRACT
Arbitration is a creature of contract. This paradigm is so basic that it is
accepted in all the States of the world. Nevertheless, arbitration is perceived as
the most suitable method for the settlement of commercial disputes. Virtually all
commercial disputes are resolved through arbitration. The natural order of
things has been reversed. In commercial matters, at least, arbitration is the rule,
and courts the exception. Why is it, then, that parties must opt in for a solution
which appears as the most natural one in the community? I propose to question
this default rule and propose an extreme shift: Arbitration should become the
default jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
“The task is not so much to see what no one has yet seen; but to think what
nobody has yet thought, about that which everybody sees”
—Erwin Schrödinger, Nobel Prize, Physics
Paradigms are one of the worst enemies of knowledge. This is because
behind paradigms there are hidden innovations that we do not perceive because
of our tendency to respect what has already been established. Undeniably,
paradigms can condemn us to intellectual immobility.1
The basic paradigm of arbitration is that consent is the cornerstone of
arbitration. Thus, the default rule has always been that, unless the parties agree
otherwise, they should resolve their disputes in courts.2 This rule has been a
misunderstood paradigm of history. The contractual foundation of arbitration is
so internalized in the mind of arbitral actors that it is often thought that
arbitration and consent are like shadow and body.3
This Article attempts to knock down the remaining columns on which the
contractual foundation of arbitration was built in order to demonstrate that, at
least in commercial disputes, the state should no longer be considered the default
provider in resolving commercial disputes. Hence, this Article will demonstrate
on its face that in commercial disputes, arbitration must be the default
jurisdiction. This would imply a shift of the paradigm in which arbitration would
be non-consensual.
Consent is an obstacle for the effectiveness of international arbitration.
Arbitral tribunals and arbitral institutions are so aware of this reality that they
frequently bypass consent without regrets. Additionally, several professors from
Yale Law School have argued that default rules should reflect the preferences of
the majority. At least in international commerce, virtually all disputes are
resolved through arbitration. Hence, the latest surveys conducted by Queen
Mary University and White & Case show that an overwhelming majority of the
respondent group (ninety-seven percent) prefer arbitration as their method of
resolving cross-border disputes.4

1

See FABIO NÚÑEZ DEL PRADO, DESMITIFICANDO MITOS: ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DE LA DOBLE INSTANCIA

EN EL PROCESO CIVIL: PRESENTACIÓN DE ALFREDO BULLARD [DEMYSTIFYING MYTHS: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL: PRESENTATION OF ALFREDO BULLARD] 11

(Thomson Reuters 2016).
PAUL FRIEDLAND & STAVROS BREKOULAKIS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5 (2018).
3
Id.
4
Id.
2
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If that is so—if it is known that the majority demands arbitration to resolve
their disputes and it is known that arbitration has become the natural mechanism
to resolve disputes—why isn’t arbitration recognized as the default
jurisdiction?5 It seems that the recognition of arbitration as the default
jurisdiction is inevitable.
Moreover, converting to arbitration in the default jurisdiction will generate
positive externalities since it would alleviate the burden of the commercial
justice system by outsourcing a range of disputes to arbitration. Similarly, to the
extent that the cost of the proceedings would be internalized by the litigants, it
will also be an efficient mechanism to save public funds.

I.

THE FALLACY OF CONSENT

Is consent inherent to arbitration? Everyone has heard at least once the
phrases: “arbitration is a creature of contract,” or “like consummate romance,
arbitration rests on consent.”6 These are two of the most ubiquitous phrases in
the world of arbitration. For most lawyers, it seems obvious that arbitration must
have a contractual nature. So, every time a legal system is designed, the premise
is that state justice is the rule; arbitration, the exception.7
But when arbitration as the exception is asked why, the answer is not so
obvious. Is consent inherent and part of the essence of arbitration? Once I asked
5
GILLES CUNIBERTI, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION TOWARDS DEFAULT
ARBITRATION 6–7 (2017) [hereinafter RETHINKING].
6
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan, J.
concurring) (stating “arbitration is a creature of contract”); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243,
251 (1977); William H. Park, Non-Signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator’s Dilemma, in THE
LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 553, 553 (Lawrence W. Newman & Richard
D. Hill eds., 2008); see also KARIM YOUSSEF, CONSENT IN CONTEXT: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (West 2012) (“[T]he term ‘Arbitration is a creature of contract’ was used more
than 97 times in U.S. federal courts alone since the early 1970s. The seminal rule is often recited even in cases
where consensual analysis is excluded in the particular case.”).
7
YOUSSEF, supra note 6, at 2. Upon knowledge and belief, in all States of the world, the judiciary is the
default provider of justice. Arbitration, on the other hand, has always been viewed as an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism. Id.

‘Arbitration is consensual by nature’ or ‘[a]rbitration is a creature of contract’ seems banal
clichés even for novices in arbitration. However, the consequences of this legal obviousness
command the entire legal frameworks of arbitration and extend deep into the socioeconomic and
philosophical dimensions of the institution. Scholarship conceives consent as the cornerstone of
the concept of arbitration and defines arbitration as a consensually chosen and organized form.
A universal norm of arbitration law prescribes that the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal
necessarily and exclusively rests on the agreement of the parties.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Professor Emmanuel Gaillard if it was possible to conceive a non-consensual
model of arbitration.8 He answered that he thinks it would be a different animal.9
When asked why, he answered that it was because the New York Convention
had prescribed it in that way.10 This argument is not convincing because it is
circular on its face. It would be as fallacious as arguing at a domestic level that
things are like they are because the law has determined them in that way.
In this respect, Professor Youssef has stated that:
[T]he admission of the existence of less- or nonconsensual concepts of
arbitration is conceptually problematic. Consent in arbitration is close
to legal dogma. The rarity of scholarly inquiries to explain the
theoretical basis for consent’s centralism suggests an evident or selfreliant paradigm of consensual arbitration that would need no further
justification or rationale to support it. The seminal rule is simply
recited: “The existence of both parties’ consent to submit the dispute
to arbitration is clearly a necessity.” The doctrinal transcendence of
consent not only dispenses with the need for rationalization, but also
does not authorize the existence or even the inquiry into the existence
of alternative concepts of arbitration less attached to consent. Only one
concept of arbitration exists, and that concept is consensual.11

Nevertheless, the essence of institutions cannot be found in a normative text,
but rather in the nature of things. Something is part of the essence of an
institution if, by removing it, the institution ceases to be such. Arbitration
8
Interview with Emmanuel Gaillard, Professor, Harvard L. Sch., in New Haven, Conn. (Feb. 18, 2019).
Professor Emmanuel Gaillard founded and heads Shearman & Sterling’s 100-lawyer International Arbitration
practice. He is also the Firm’s Global Head of Disputes. A Professor of Law in France, he serves as a Visiting
Professor of Law at Yale Law School and Harvard Law School. Professor Gaillard is universally regarded as a
leading authority in the fields of both commercial and investment treaty arbitration. Emmanuel Gaillard, Faculty
Profile, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/11774/Gaillard (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
9
Interview with Emmanuel Gaillard, Professor, Harvard L. Sch., in New Haven, Conn. (Feb. 18, 2019).
Once we spoke with a friend specialized in arbitration and we shared our proposal. He told us that he agreed
with the idea, but that if our model was implemented, this system of dispute resolution could not be called
arbitration because the latter was always contractual. For him, consent was inherent in arbitration; it was part of
its essence. However, this is not a tag lawsuit. You can call it non-consensual arbitration or anything you want.
If it’s necessary, it can be called something else, but non-consensual arbitration is the system that should prevail
today. In short, the only thing we want to convey is that the dispute resolution mechanism through which
commercial conflicts are resolved must be based on freedom. Id.
10
Id.; see generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (NY
Convention), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
11
YOUSSEF, supra note 6, at 53–54. Professor Karim Youssef is founder of Youssef & Partners, a Global
Arbitration Review (GAR) 100 law firm, and a regional leader in dispute resolution. Karim leads the
international arbitration and international law practices at the Firm. His practice focuses on commercial
arbitration, investment treaty arbitration, complex high-value disputes and international law, and is worldrenowned in the respective fields. Karim Youssef, Our People, YOUSSEF & PARTNERS ATTORNEYS,
https://youssef.law/our-people/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).

NÚÑEZ DEL PRADO_3.22.21

224

3/24/2021 10:54 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

without consent does not cease to be arbitration; it can perfectly exist being nonconsensual. The most paradigmatic example is mandatory arbitration in
controversies that involve the Peruvian State. With its implementation, the
contractual foundation of arbitration was broken, and arbitrations against the
Peruvian State continue to be arbitrations. In Spain, there is also a system of
mandatory arbitration and nobody doubts that it is still arbitration.12
Additionally, in investor-State arbitration the contractual nature of
arbitration is, to say the least, questionable. Many scholars have argued that the
notion of consent under bilateral investment treaties is artificial on its face.13
This is immensely relevant for the development of international arbitration. Gary
Born has recently proposed the conclusion of Bilateral Arbitration Treaties
(“BATs”) in his landmark article BITS, BATS and Buts: Reflections on
International Dispute Resolution.14 Under this theory States would agree that
12
See Drew B. Laframboise, Arbitrating the Great Writ: Resolving Federal Habeas Corpus Disputes
Through Arbitration, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1023, 1046 (2010). Laframboise notes that:

Several arbitration models—established and proposed—have advocated and used a nonconsensual, mandatory approach to arbitration, rather than a purely voluntary approach. In
various employment arbitration systems, for example, mandatory arbitration has been found to
provide parties with sufficient legal protection, flexibility, and binding resolutions to disputes.
The growth of mandatory arbitration has been significant over the past years, as industries and
businesses have recognized the mandatory arbitration process as expedient, cost-effective, and
legitimate.

Id. (citations omitted).
13
Gary Born, BITS, BATS and Buts: Reflections on International Dispute Resolution 13 YAR 3 (2014).
Born explains that:

The notion of consent under bilateral investment treaties was correctly understood to be artificial,
at least in substantial part. Jan Paulsson coined the frequently-cited, if also not entirely accurate,
phrase ‘Arbitration without privity’ - reflecting the unorthodox character of the putative
agreement to arbitrate in a BIT. That description recognized the fact that in many senses the
agreement to arbitrate resulting from a BIT was less a traditional example of arbitration by
consent and more a generally-available legislative or regulatory regime created by the States party
to the BIT for the benefit of foreign investors protected by the treaty. There was a form of consent
to BIT arbitration, but it was an attenuated form of constructed consent, derived principally from
the legislative framework of the treaty, rather than a traditional contractual relationship between
commercial counterparties who negotiate a particular arbitration agreement.

Id. See also John Cerney, Default Arbitration Provisions: One Step to Making “Great Trade Deals,” 72 RORY
BRADY ESSAY COMPETITION ARTICLES 51, 52 (2017) (“Such arbitration provisions were unique because they
allowed the investor to commence arbitration notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration agreement with the
host-state. This concept is what Jan Paulson calls ‘arbitration without privity.’”).
14
Professor Gary Born is the chair of the International Arbitration Practice Group. Professor Born is
widely regarded as one of the world’s preeminent authority on international commercial arbitration and
international litigation. He has been ranked for the past 20 years as one of the world’s leading international
arbitration practitioners and the leading arbitration practitioner in London. People: Gary Born, WILMERHALE,
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/people/gary-born (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
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international commercial disputes—disputes involving business-to-business
(“B2B”) transactions—would be submitted to arbitration as a default mechanism
under a BAT.15 The irony of the BAT proposal is that consent is conspicuous in
its absence.16
As explained by Professor Born:
And yet is a BAT really inconsistent with the basic concept of party
autonomy? Although BATs may be a step further than the mode of
constructive consent in BITs, adopting such treaties are not that much
of a further step beyond what we already recognize to be effective
consent to international arbitration in BITs. And, insofar as this form
of consent is a step beyond past models, it is one that is sensible and
justified. . . . Of course, there is no express consent to arbitration under
the proposed BAT, which is in some tension with the traditional
maxim that “arbitration is a creature of consent” and that “without an
arbitration agreement, there can be no arbitration.”17

To make matters worse, virtually all American adhesion contracts include
arbitration clauses.18 So, what happens if consumers do not want to resolve their
controversies in arbitrations? They have no choice—no margin of negotiation at
all. Consumers cannot refuse or find a substitute that allows them to evade
arbitration. In the United States, there is de facto mandatory arbitration in
consumer law. Does that mean that this phenomenon cannot be called
arbitration? Of course not.
As Felix Cohen has suggested, reasoning in an exclusively legal way
necessarily leads to a circular reasoning that tends to contain what is defined in
the definition.19 The contractual nature of arbitration is so circular that it looks
like a traffic circle with no exit streets.20

15

Born, supra note 13, at 9.
Cerney, supra note 13, at 6 (describing criticisms of DAPs as follows: “Perhaps the biggest concern
with DAPs is that they would require an arbitral tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute between parties
which have not consented to have their disputes heard by that tribunal. As noted previously, this is fundamentally
at odds with the core of arbitration.”).
17
Born, supra note 13, at 10.
18
J.R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1631, 1633 (2005)
(discussing how American adhesion contracts include arbitration). Mandatory arbitration directly imposed by
the law of regulatory agencies is not infrequent in domestic settings. Id. The United States, leading this trend, is
an example of a legal system in which diverse forms of compelled domestic arbitration are gradually displacing
the judiciary. Id.
19
NÛÑEZ DEL PRADO, supra note 1, at 11. See generally Felix Cohen, Felix Cohen: Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 814–17 (1935) (discussing what is in a Trade
Name).
20
NÛÑEZ DEL PRADO, supra note 1, at 11.
16
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The essence of arbitration is the maximization of freedom (i.e., the
maximization of party autonomy). This includes the freedom to appoint the
arbitrators, tailor the arbitral procedure, and choose the applicable law. If parties
are deprived of these freedoms, the essence of arbitration is snatched from its
being. This system of dispute resolution could no longer be called arbitration.
II. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE CONTRACTUAL FOUNDATION
OF ARBITRATION
The contractual foundation of arbitration creates countless problems of the
most diverse nature. Before exposing the seven problems identified in this
Article, this Section reviews a case illustrating various obstacles generated by
the contractual nature of arbitration.
A. A Case to Illustrate
Mr. Bender owns a million-dollar property in Peru. In 2008, due to the
financial crisis, Mr. Bender had serious liquidity problems, which led to trouble
paying his debts. So, he immediately put the property up for sale. Several
businessmen from other cities showed interest in the property. Because the
market value of the property was not enough to pay all his debts, he thought his
best option was to sell the same property to several people at the same time.
Mr. Bender sold the property to individuals who lived in various countries:
Mr. Haissiner (Argentina), Mr. Oñate (Mexico), Mr. Padilla (Chile), and Mr.
Girón (Colombia). Each buyer had a subjective interest in the property, paying
millions of dollars for it. None of the buyers knew the property was
simultaneously being sold to other people.
In each of the purchase contracts, Mr. Bender strategically included
incompatible arbitration agreements: nothing coincided in them. They had
different arbitral institutions, different number of arbitrators, different
mechanisms to appoint the arbitrators, and so on. Moreover, each of the
contracts contained different applicable law, creating a distinct transfer of
property system within each. Worse, Mr. Bender added a provision stating that
each party would assume the cost of arbitration equally.
After entering into the purchase contracts and receiving payments, Mr.
Bender informed the creditors that he would not be able to relinquish the
property. Annoyed, the creditors decided to file arbitrations against Mr. Bender
individually. Of course, at that time they did not know there were other creditors
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who were claiming ownership rights in the same property. Since each had an
interest in the property, they sought specific performance.
Time passed and the arbitral procedures advanced. The creditors eventually
learned that Mr. Bender had sold the property to several people simultaneously
and contacted each other. Meeting in Lima to discuss the matter, they concluded
that if they really wished to resolve the dispute effectively, they needed to
consolidate the arbitrations.
They consulted with their attorneys—arbitration specialists—who agreed
that the consolidation alternative was impossible. There were several problems:
the arbitration agreements were incompatible, and since all the cases would have
to be consolidated into one, it was unclear which of the four arbitral procedures
should take precedence in the arbitration. Moreover, to the extent that the
applicable law of the contract had various criteria for transfer of ownership, each
of the creditors wished the other arbitral procedures to be consolidated to theirs.
Furthermore, the lawyers told their clients that in order to consolidate the
arbitral procedures they needed the consent of Mr. Bender. They could not
believe it. It was absurd to demand Bender’s consent because, as Mr. Haissiner
pertinently said, “it would be like digging his own grave.” All the counsels
answered in the same way: “regretfully, in arbitration, consent is sacred.”
The lawyers reminded them that each had agreed with Mr. Bender about how
their respective controversies would be resolved and, therefore, the consent to
arbitrate must be respected. They were astonished: It seemed impossible that in
the face of this fraud, they were helpless. The counsels reiterated: “It is a
problem. We are aware of that. But the contractual foundation of arbitration must
be respected.”
The controversies were resolved in isolated arbitrations, which was an
equivalent to not resolving them at all. The claimants continued their arbitral
procedures and prevailed. Consequently, the arbitral tribunals recognized the
property rights of all four claimants but did not provide the slightest indication
of which of the four should be preferred. Contradictory awards were rendered,
of which at least three were unenforceable. Obviously, the four claimants could
not own the property at the same time, meaning the arbitral procedures were
useless. Arbitration is intended to resolve disputes, but in this case, it only served
to delay the final resolution of the dispute. The arbitral awards existed only on
paper and were far from being effective in reality. The fault, then, was entirely
attributable to the contractual foundation of arbitration.
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While this anecdote is purely fictitious, it is drawn directly from reality. This
is daily bread for those working in the field of arbitration. Although the
principles of arbitration were strictly respected in all the arbitral procedures,
contradictory awards were rendered and, at least three, were unenforceable. The
anecdote speaks for itself. The contractual foundation of arbitration is, indeed,
highly problematic.
B. The Countless Problems Created By the Contractual Nature of Arbitration
“[C]onsensualism is so deeply rooted in international arbitral theory and
practice that evoking noncontractual or less-contractual international
commercial arbitration would have seemed, until recently, a self-contradiction
or an abuse of language. However, as all empires rise and fall, the empire of
consent in arbitration, believed eternal, is falling.”21 As suggested by Professor
Graves, “real ‘consent’ arguably ceased to be the touchstone of arbitration law
some time ago.”22
The truth is that the contractual foundation of arbitration is a clear obstacle
to the efficiency of the arbitral procedure, which explains why consent is in
decline.23 The following Section analyzes seven problems that the contractual
foundation of arbitration creates.
1. The Risk of Contradictory and Unenforceable Arbitral Awards
Contradictory and unenforceable awards are a staple of arbitration.24 This is
because the contractual basis of arbitration is founded on a conceptual mistake:
a conflict is equated with a sole legal relationship. It is true though that in many
cases conflicts involve one single legal relationship, but that is not always the
case.25

21

YOUSSEF, supra note 6, at 2–3.
Jack Graves, Court Litigation Over Arbitration Agreements: Is It Time for a New Default Rule? 23 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 16 (2012) (citation omitted) (discussing arbitration as the default). Professor Graves is
Director of Digital Legal Education, Director of the FlexTime J.D. Program and Professor of Law. Jack Michael
Graves, Resume, TOURO COLL. L. CTR., https://www.tourolaw.edu/AboutTouroLaw/uploads/faculty_cv/
Graves_Jack_2.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2020).
23
Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract. The Case for Default Arbitration in International Commercial
Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 419, 432 (2008) (discussing disadvantages of arbitration).
24
YOUSSEF, supra note 6, at 3.
25
Id.
22
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In this respect, Professor Youssef has stated that:
Arbitrations involving complex jurisdictional questions have become
commonplace. The simple classic setting of two parties, one contract,
and one arbitration agreement is doubled with multiparty,
multicontract, or multi-issue disputes that have flourished
tremendously, as a natural by-product of the universal development of
arbitration and the complexity of global commerce. . . . Nevertheless,
an arbitration agreement by virtue of its inherent privity and required
formalism falls short of addressing the jurisdictional complexity of
multiparty or multicontract relations. . . . ‘The law of arbitration cannot
ignore those situations [complex arbitrations] which have become the
norm in present day international commerce.’ It had to adapt.26

In effect, cases involving conflicts with two or more legal relationships
abound. These are called complex arbitrations.27 In such cases the tribunal
cannot resolve the dispute without analyzing all relevant legal relationships
simultaneously.28 The difficulty, however, is that many times these legal
relationships have incompatible arbitration agreements and parties do not
consent to consolidate the arbitrations at the outset.29
Since arbitration is based on consent, and the terms agreed by the parties in
the arbitration, agreements must be strictly respected; it frequently happens that
a single controversy ends up being isolated in several arbitrations.30 Indeed, the
contractual foundation of arbitration determines that closely interrelated
controversies end up being resolved separately.
As a natural consequence, the focus of the controversy is lost. Since
arbitration agreements are incompatible, it is impossible to consolidate the
arbitral procedures. This illustrates the risk of contradictory and unenforceable
awards and, consequently, it undermines the credibility of the legal system.
In summary, as in the case of Mr. Bender, the arbitral awards ultimately
serve no purpose. This is not remediable, because the consolidation of arbitral
26

Id. at 3.
Id. (“[S]tatistics suggest that complex arbitrations constitute about one-third of all new cases submitted
to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The percentage of arbitrations involving more than two parties
increased from 20.4% of ICC cases in 1995 to 30% in 2001.”).
28
Id. at 4–5.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 3. Youssef describes arbitration proceedings as being “initiated by multiple claimants or by
27

one claimant against multiple respondents.” Id. Adding that “[n]onparties may seek to join the
proceedings or may be ordered to. Several contracts between the same or different parties may contribute
to the implementation of a global economic operation, and raise difficult questions of consolidation of
claims arising under the different contracts and often governed by distinct jurisdiction clauses.” Id.
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procedures requires the consent of all parties, which rarely happens. What is
undeniable, however, is that a system in which there is a risk of contradictory
and unenforceable awards must be rethought.
2. Arbitrators Cannot See the Forest for the Trees
To the extent that it is not always possible for arbitral procedures to be
consolidated, interrelated controversies frequently end up being resolved
separately. This is extremely damaging to the decision-making process because,
when resolving the dispute, arbitrators cannot see the forest for the trees, which
implies that the arbitral award goes to the wrong person.
3. An Inconsistent and Hypocritical Model in Which Consent Is Routinely
Sacrificed Prevails: The Elasticity of Consensualism in Arbitration
It is inconsistent to establish a system that holds arbitration consent as
sacred, and yet routinely bypasses it. If the system chosen is one in which the
foundation of arbitration is contractual, consent must be strictly respected, and
exceptions cannot be permitted to occur frequently. It is one thing is to have an
exception that proves the rule, and quite another to have an exception that
becomes the rule.31
In this regard, Youssef has affirmed that:
The inadequacy of an exclusive reliance on the arbitration agreement
in certain jurisdictional settings led arbitration tribunals and courts to
abandon a formalist approach and sometimes even a strict approach to
[consensualism]. Tribunals often assert jurisdiction in cases where the
claimant did not sign an arbitration agreement or the respondent did
not accept expressly or implicitly the jurisdiction of the tribunal. More
and more, courts compel non-signatories to arbitrate and validate or
enforce arbitral awards rendered for or against non-signatories. A more
complex scene has emerged characterized by arbitral processes
reaching in different ways beyond the original scope of the arbitration
agreement which has initially founded them.32

31

Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 434
([T]he most interesting manifestation of the pro-arbitration policy of French courts has been their
willingness to bypass the contractual nature of arbitration when it is revealed as unfavorable to
the efficacy of the arbitral process. Originally, the voluntary foundation of arbitration was critical
to the development of this alternative mode of dispute resolution, as it was perceived as the sole
means to legitimize private adjudication.).

32

YOUSSEF, supra note 6, at 3–4.
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There are innumerable cases in which, with the purpose of converting
arbitration into an effective mechanism, legislators, arbitral institutions, judges,
and arbitral tribunals have bypassed consent.33 Having consent as the
cornerstone of arbitration is a serious drawback—it is bypassed on a daily basis.
There are reputable arbitrators, who have established the public policies on
arbitration in their respective countries, who admit without any regret that they
have had to make mischief with arbitral consent to make arbitration an effective
mechanism.
The case of Mr. Bender illustrates how there may be cases in which it is
precisely the consent requirement that makes the dispute unresolvable.
Innovative non-signatory theories, such as the group of companies, the
interrelation, good faith, and many others have had to be invented to incorporate
a non-signatory into an arbitration procedure and thus avoid unjust results.34
What should really concern us is that, to avoid an unfair solution, the
arbitrators in Mr. Bender’s case might have resorted to one of the non-signatory
theories to solve the controversy fairly.35 Thus, even though the arbitrators

33
Graves, supra note 22, at 16 (“A knowledgeable observer of U.S. jurisprudence interpreting and
applying the Federal Arbitration Act might reasonably argue that, as a practical matter, the courts have already
left consent far behind in deciding issues of arbitral jurisdiction.”).
34
See FRIEDLAND & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 2, at 10 (stating one of the main defects of arbitration is
its lack of power in relation to third parties, meaning that arbitral tribunals have very often ignored consent with
the purpose of making arbitration more effective); see also Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 437–39 (citations
omitted)

([J]udgments of the Cour de cassation have been increasingly liberal in their assessment of the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Arbitration agreements have been found to bind parties
who had not concluded them originally with surprising ease. . . .
I do not argue that these recent liberal assessments of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate
are evidence of the willingness of the Cour de cassation to abandon the contractual foundation of
arbitration. My claim is much more limited. I submit that the faith of the French senior judiciary
in the importance of the contractual foundation of arbitration has been fading. Increasingly,
French senior judges are ready to ignore it in order to pursue other policies, and in particular to
promote international arbitration as an efficient mode of dispute resolution.
The truth of the matter is that they are not shocked by the idea of an arbitration without consent.
What does the French experience tell us? I do not claim that French solutions are better for the
sole reason that they promote arbitration and are more liberal. My claim is, again, more limited.
The recent developments in the French law of international arbitration beg the question that is
the topic of this Article: should arbitration lose its contractual foundation? The French experience
shows that the question is not only academic. The repeated attacks of French courts on such a
central, unchallenged, doctrine reveal that it has tremendous practical significance.).
35
See, e.g., YOUSSEF, supra note 6, at 33. For example: implied consent, promissory estoppel,
interrelation, and good faith. Id.
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would have rendered a fair award on the merits, they would have had to find
consent when, in fact, it did not exist.
Since the contractual nature of arbitration creates several difficulties,
specialists have been forced to solve them in creative and imaginative ways.
These sophisticated solutions, however, have ended up relativizing genuine
consent.36 Arbitrators very often have to work magic when the contractual
foundation of arbitration threatens to produce an unfair decision. What has ended
up happening is that the importance of consent in arbitration has been relativized
and is therefore slowly losing force.37 There is no legal discipline in which
consent is interpreted as widely as in the arbitration field.38
These inconceivable events only happen in arbitration. In any other field of
law, they would be unthinkable. It would be unacceptable to extend the effects
of a civil contract by virtue of a non-signatory theory. For instance, it is well
known that, in order to incorporate a non-signatory, the requirements to lift the
corporate veil on the merits of a dispute are much stricter than in the
jurisdictional phase. Unlike arbitration, in civil law the consent is given the
importance it deserves.
Although the cleverness of these non-signatory theories must be
acknowledged, the truth is that there is no discipline of law in which consent is
more elastic than arbitration. The consent to be found in some of these theories
is so thin that sometimes arbitrators must make herculean efforts to find it. The
arbitration agreement is stretched to the point of unreasonableness. It would not
be an exaggeration to speak about the “elastic” nature of arbitral consent.39

36
37
38

Id.
Id. at 2.
Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 484–85 (citations omitted)

(It happens to be that many of such rules are widely perceived as limiting to the efficacy of
the arbitral process, and as such as necessary evils. One of the best examples is precisely
the rule preventing joinders of third parties absent the agreement of all parties concerned.
In practice, this has most often meant that arbitration could not properly cope with multiparty disputes. So, modifying the rule and allowing arbitration to deal more efficiently with
multi-party disputes would not be regretted by many. The new paradigm would actually
lead to an improvement of the arbitral process.).
39
Arbitration Rules Mediation Rules, INT’L CHAMBER OF COM. 71–72 (May 2019). Another example in
which consent has been sacrificed can be found in the ICC Expedited Procedure provided in Appendix VI of the
ICC Rules. Id. Hence, Article 1 of Appendix VI of the Expedited Procedure Provisions establishes that when the
amount in dispute is less than $2,000,000 USD, the ICC Expedited Procedure Provisions shall apply. Id. Thus,
Article 2 of Appendix VI of the ICC Rules establishes that the ICC Court may, despite any contrary provision
in the arbitration agreement, appoint a sole arbitrator. Id. It is also established that, after the tribunal has been
constituted, parties cannot add new claims, unless they have been authorized to do so by the arbitral tribunal. Id.
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One of the theories of non-signatory parties in which consent has been
sacrificed is the theory of interrelation. This Section examines cases that will
help illustrate the absurdity of this theory and why it bypasses arbitral consent.
In J. Ryan & Sons v. Rhone Poulenc Textile—by virtue of the theory of
interrelation—a company was forced to resolve its arbitral claims against the
controlling party (who was a non-signatory) of its co-contractors.40 The dispute
with the parent company and the dispute with the co-contractors were based on
the same facts and were, thus, determined to be inseparable by the tribunal.41
The arbitral tribunal, nevertheless, did not analyze whether the parent company
had expressed its consent.
On the other hand, in McBro Planning & Development Co. & McCarthy
Brothers Co. v. Triangle Electrical Construction Co., the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals decided that, although there was no arbitration agreement between
the parties, the two parties that had (with a third) interrelated contracts with
identical arbitration clauses, must resolve their controversies in a single
arbitration.42 Again, the tribunal did not analyze the consent of the parties to
resolve the controversies jointly.43
The arbitral tribunals made no effort to find consent in any of the above
cases. The effects of the arbitration agreement were extended to the non-

Moreover, the tribunal may, after consulting with the parties, decide not to allow requests for document
production or limit the number, length and scope of written submissions and written witness evidence. Last but
not least, the tribunal may decide the dispute solely on the basis of the documents submitted by the parties, with
no hearing and no examination of witnesses or experts. It is undeniable that parties’ consent is being undermined.
Thus, although the parties have consented in their arbitration agreement to have the dispute resolved by three
arbitrators, that there will be a stage for production of documents, as well as direct and cross-examinations, the
arbitral tribunal has the power to ignore such agreements.
40
J.J. Ryan & Sons v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320–21 (4th Cir. 1988).
41
Id. See generally E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates,
S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2001); MS Dealer Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1999); Sunkist Soft
Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757–78 (11th Cir. 1993).
42
McBro Planning & Development Co. & McCarthy Brothers Co. v. Triangle Electrical Construction
Co., 741 F.2d 342, 343–44 (11th Cir. 1984).
43
See Roque Caivano, Arbitraje y grupos de sociedades. Extensión de los efectos de un acuerdo arbitral
a quien no ha sido signatario, 1 LIMA ARBITRATION 121, 136 (2006) (citing Hill v. G E Power Systems, Inc.,
282 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2002)). The criterion of interrelation was also used by the Court of Appeals of the Fifth
Circuit in Hill v. G E Power Systems, Inc. to compel arbitration of a non-signatory, on the grounds that the claim
brought by one of the signatories of the contract contained allegations of substantially interdependent and
concerted misconduct by the other signatory and a third party. See also Hill 282 F.3d at 349. In summary, the
criteria used by the U.S. Circuits were: (i) that the controversies were based on the same facts and were
essentially inseparable; (ii) that the controversy derived from interrelated contracts that contained identical
arbitration clauses; and (iii) that the controversy was based on allegations of substantially interdependent and
concerted misconduct of the other party and a third party. Id.

NÚÑEZ DEL PRADO_3.22.21

234

3/24/2021 10:54 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

signatories simply because the controversies were interrelated. Consent,
nevertheless, was completely ignored. The theory of interrelation, then, is a
detriment of consent.44
4. The Contractual Foundation of Arbitration Is Very Often Strategically
Used by Parties to Delay and, in Some Cases, Even Evade the
Arbitration
The contractual foundation of arbitration permits multiple grounds under
which the parties may object to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The parties, for
instance, may argue that the arbitration agreement is void, that the tribunal
resolved on matters not subject to its jurisdiction, that the arbitration clause is
pathological,45 or that one of the parties is not bound by the arbitration
agreement. What is more, the parties can invoke these grounds to set aside the
arbitral awards, threatening the arbitration with a complete loss of effectiveness.
Thus, the contractual foundation of arbitration is very often strategically
used by parties to delay and, in some cases, even evade the arbitration.46
Consent, then, constitutes an authentic obstacle to the effectiveness of
arbitration.47 As explained by Cuniberti, “the policy reason behind this solution
44
Hill, 282 F.3d at 347–48 (explaining the inclusion of a non-signatory party due to the interrelatedness
of the cases). There can be no doubt that in the case of Mr. Bender, any of the U.S. Circuits would have extended
the scope of one of the arbitration agreements to the three other creditors under the theory of interrelation. This
is an excellent example of how arbitrators act in detriment of consent in order to gain effectiveness in the arbitral
procedure.
45
“The term ‘pathological clauses’, coined by Frédéric Eisemann, is widely used to describe arbitration
clauses with apparent defect[s] liable to disrupt the smooth progress of the arbitration. Jae Hee Suh,
Interpretation of Pathological Clauses: A Cautionary Tale?, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW ARBITRATION
BLOG (Jan. 31, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/interpretation-of-pathological-clauses-acautionary-tale/#:~:text=The%20term%20%E2%80%9Cpathological%20clauses%E2%80%9D%2C,smooth%
20progress%20of%20the%20arbitration.
46
Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 420.
47
Id. at 434–35 (citations omitted)

(However, as arbitration developed, it became apparent that its contractual foundation could also
be used strategically by parties wishing to delay or even to avoid the resolution of their dispute.
The contractual nature of arbitration began to appear as a problem. It offered multiple arguments
to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal by challenging the existence and the validity of the
arbitral agreement, and thus the power to adjudicate of the tribunal. The oldest argument was
certainly the challenge of this power on the ground that the tribunal had set aside the contract
containing the arbitral clause, and that, as a consequence, it had retroactively suppressed its own
adjudicatory power, which flowed from the arbitration clause of the contract. The doctrine of
separability was crafted to reject this argument. Now widely accepted, the doctrine provides that
the arbitration clause is a peculiar clause of the contract, which as such can be separated from it,
and thus may survive it if it is cancelled or otherwise terminated. The jurisdiction of arbitrators
thus remains even if they rule that the (rest of the) contract has been retroactively set aside.).
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is that the contractual nature of arbitration can be used strategically by
defendants to delay and sometimes avoid the arbitral process[.]”48
The world of commercial dispute resolution would be more effective if
arbitration were the default jurisdiction. The endless discussions regarding the
objective scope of the arbitration agreement would be eliminated. Whether the
arbitration clause is broad or restricted would no longer be in dispute. The
number of pathological arbitration clauses would be significantly reduced. It
would not be necessary to complicate our lives with non-signatory theories.
Arbitration would become a much simpler and effective mechanism, thereby
promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes.
5. Fiction Needs to Be Created to Correct the Deficiencies of the System
The principle of separability of the arbitration agreement, a legal fiction that
contravenes logic principles, was created to correct the deficiencies stemming
from the contractual foundation of arbitration. If the cornerstone of arbitration
were not based on consent, such principle would be unnecessary.49
It is undeniable that the principle of separability constitutes an artificial
creation. By definition, the nullity of a contract implies that all its clauses are
void. The separability of the arbitration agreement is a fiction that was created
to ensure that the arbitration will achieve the purpose for which it was intended.50

48
Id. at 420. Cuniberti states that “[i]t could seem astonishing that the most essential feature of arbitration
. . . could appear as an obstacle to its implementation.” If arbitration was perceived as being one option of dispute
resolution, among many others, “then its contractual foundation should appear as the most natural technique to
allow the parties to choose it and to protect them from being dragged into an alternative derogatory mode of
dispute resolution without seriously considering making that unusual, out of the ordinary, choice.” Id. at 420.
Further, Cuniberti speaks on one way of seeing a critical shift in paradigm by interpreting an evolution, like the
French one, in a way which negates the contractual nature of arbitration. Id. at 420-21. The chosen mode has
become the natural mode of dispute resolution. Id. at 421. “Because it does not appear anymore as an unusual []
…way to resolve international commercial disputes, there is much less need, if any, to protect the consent of the
parties to resort to it, and indeed to actually find such consent.” Id. Cuniberti addresses potential doubt by stating
that “it makes sense to consider that the parties would actually agree to the natural mode of dispute resolution of
the community.” Id. Professor Gilles Cuniberti is Professor of Comparative Law and Private International Law
at the University of Luxembourg. He is also the precursor of the proposal of default arbitration. Prof. Dr. Gilles
Cuniberti,
People,
Univ.
Luxembourg,
https://wwwen.uni.lu/fdef/department
_of_law/people/gilles_cuniberti (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
49
Graves, supra note 22, at 17 (“[A]n agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the parties’ main

contract is no more than a typical majoritarian default contract term provided in a variety of contractual
contexts. Admittedly, this is arguably inconsistent with the doctrine of separability, but that doctrine
would be rendered [] unnecessary if arbitration were the default.”).
50
Fiona Winnifred Lakareber, A Critical Assessment of the Separability Doctrine, Its Impact, and
Application, 6 MANCHESTER REV. L. CRIME & ETHICS 148 (2017). If the arbitration agreement were not an
autonomous contract, the defendant would always argue that the contract is null and the controversy would end
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This principle, however, is only necessary when arbitration is contractual in
nature. If arbitration were the default jurisdiction, the existence of the principle
of separability would not be necessary, eliminating all the principles that its
creation implies.
6. Many Arbitrable Controversies Are Not Resolved through Arbitration
This Section considers examples of arbitrable controversies that are virtually
always resolved by courts.
a. Torts Cases
To the extent that arbitration has a contractual foundation, it is virtually
impossible that an arbitration agreement exists in a torts controversy.51 Since no
one knows when or with whom an accident may occur, the parties are usually
not bound by any arbitration agreement.52
b. Real-Estate Cases53
In real-estate cases, controversies are usually resolved in courts, because
arbitration agreements do not exist. Since real-estate controversies are of free
disposition, they can be perfectly resolved through arbitration without
congesting courts.

up being resolved in the judiciary, precisely what the parties wished to avoid.
51
See generally Travis Peeler, Contract and Tort Law, LEGALMATCH (July 17, 2017), https://www.
legalmatch.com/law-library/article/contract-and-tort-law.html (explaining the differences between contracts and
torts).
52
It could be argued, however, that the controversy can still be resolved through arbitration. However,
after the accident occurs, the defendant has no incentive to enter into an arbitration agreement. Quite the opposite.
He has every incentive to resolve the dispute in courts. Obviously, he wants the judgment to be rendered as late
as possible. As Shavell points out, the benefits of arbitration are greater when agreed to ex ante than when
established ex post. See generally Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995) (explaining the advantages of ex ante alternative dispute resolution). Similarly, Caplan
and Stringham state that “although many people agree to arbitration after a dispute occurs, arbitration usually
works best and is clearly ex ante utility-enhancing to all parties involved when stipulated in an initial contract.”
Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, Privatizing the Adjudication of Disputes, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 503,
523 (2008) (citation omitted).
53
Cases in which the ownership of a property is in dispute, such as an interdict, an eviction against the
sub-tenant, etc.
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c. Complex Contractual Cases Involving More Than One Legal
Relationship
The most paradigmatic example of complex contractual cases involving
more than one legal relationship occurs when several creditors have claims over
the same property. If they all have the same claim over the same property, how
can all the claims be resolved in the same arbitration? It could be argued that this
is perfectly possible because the proceedings can be consolidated. This option,
however, is not plausible when the arbitration agreements are incompatible,
which frequently occurs.54
To the extent that all these disputes—torts, real-estate, and complex
contractual cases—are resolved in courts, recognizing arbitration as the default
jurisdiction for commercial disputes will significantly reduce the burden of the
judiciary.55 As a result, courts will be able to devote more time to criminal or
administrative disputes, for example.56
7. The Contractual Foundation of Arbitration Is a Strong Impediment to
Initiate Class-Actions
American transnational corporations tend to include arbitration clauses in
their adhesion contracts to prevent consumers from filing class-actions. They
hide behind the contractual foundation of arbitration to curtail payments for

54

Caivano, supra at note 43, at 154. This is precisely what happened in the case of Mr. Bender.
See generally Barbara Kate Repa, Arbitration Pros and Cons, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html (explaining the advantages of arbitration in reference to the legal
process). We can also add to the list the cases in which, despite having the economic resources, the parties refuse
to resolve the controversy in arbitration because they do not want to internalize the costs of their disputes.
56
Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 429. Cuniberti proposes a model with two series of costs. “First, the private
55

resolution of disputes shifts costs from the state to the litigants. The litigation costs of the parties increase.
Second, courts serve functions other than dispute resolution that private adjudicators may not serve, or at
least not as well. The proposed model may then entail societal costs.” Id.
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damages.57 This is a problem that has already been denounced in the United
States.58
Since arbitration has a contractual foundation, the arbitration clause only
binds the parties who sign the adhesion contract. This makes it very difficult for
the consumers to initiate arbitral class-actions because by signing the adhesion
contracts that includes the arbitration clauses, the transnational company agrees
to arbitrate the dispute with each of the consumers separately.59 By definition,
the arbitral class-action contravenes the contractual nature of arbitration.60
None of this would happen if arbitration were the default jurisdiction. The
transnational company could not hide behind the contractual foundation of
arbitration to evade consumer class-actions. Since in the proposed model
arbitration would be the default jurisdiction, consumers can join and initiate an
arbitral class-action against whoever they like. The arbitration agreement would
no longer be an obstacle.
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF NON-CONSENSUAL ARBITRATION
In the following sections I will develop three interdisciplinary arguments
that support the proposal of default arbitration.

57
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015). Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff state that:

On Page 5 of a credit card contract used by American Express, beneath an explainer on interest
rates and late fees, past the details about annual membership, is a clause that most customers
probably miss. If cardholders have a problem with their account, American Express explains, the
company ‘may elect to resolve any claim by individual arbitration.’ Those nine words are at the
center of a far-reaching power play orchestrated by American corporations, an investigation by
The New York Times has found. By inserting individual arbitration clauses into a soaring number
of consumer and employment contracts, companies like American Express devised a way to
circumvent the courts and bar people from joining together in class-action lawsuits, realistically
the only tool citizens have to fight illegal or deceitful business practices.
(emphasis added); see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action
Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017) (emphasis added). In an effort to “circumvent the courts and bar people from
pooling their resources in class-action lawsuits” “credit card companies and banks have inserted arbitration

clauses into the fine print of financial contracts[.]” Id. “By forcing people into private arbitration, the
clauses effectively take away one of the few tools that individuals have to fight predatory and deceptive
business practices.” Id.
58
59
60

Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 57.
Silver-Greenberg, supra note 57 (emphasis added).
Id.
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A. Economic Argument: Arbitration Must Be Recognized as the Default
Jurisdiction Because under Economic Theory the Default Rules Should Be
Designed Based on What the Majority Prefers
In common law, many authors have argued that, as a general rule, default
rules should be based on majority preference.61 In this regard, Professors Ayres62
and Gertner63 have contended that:

61
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989). Two distinct classes governing the legal rules of contracts and corporations
exist. Id. “The larger class consists of “default” rules that parties can contract around by prior agreement,

while the smaller, but important, class consists of “immutable” rules that parties cannot change by
contractual agreement.” Id. There are default and immutable rules. Id. “Default rules fill the gaps in
incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties’ contract around them. Immutable rules cannot be contracted
around; they govern even if the parties attempt to contract around them.” Id. See also RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (Little, Brown and Company eds., 3d ed. 1986) (arguing that the default rules
should “economize on transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise
have to adopt by express agreement”); Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 396, 400–01 (2009). Ben-Shahar notes that:
there is a troubling paradox surrounding one of the most basic tenets of contract law that gaps in
contracts should be filled with terms that mimic the will of the parties-terms that most parties
would have jointly chosen. On the one hand, this conception of gap filling makes basic sense: It
minimizes the need of the parties to contract around the default rule, and it spells out performance
provisions that maximize the parties’ joint well-being. But on the other hand, the mimic-theparties’-will principle assumes that the parties’ joint will exists. It assumes that there is a single
term such that, if only the parties spent the time and attention dealing with the gap, they would
have jointly supported the drafting of this term. Yet the existence of a gap in a contract is often
an indication that a consensus could not be reached-that a single jointly preferable term does not
exist. The claim from which the analysis in this paper begins is that there are situations in which
more than one term satisfies the standard conception of the joint will of the parties to a contract.
Absent a more powerful prescription, then, the will-mimicking principle would be indeterminate
and too amorphous to fill the gap.
Id.; Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and its Proper Domain, 38

VAND. L. REV. 829, 835–36 (1985) (stating that the default rules governing the debtor-creditor
relationship “should provide all the parties with the type of contract that they would have agreed to
if they had had the time and money to bargain over all aspects of their deal”); Michael Whincop &
Mary Keynes, Putting the Private Back into Private International Law: Default Rules and the
Proper Law of the Contract, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 515, 523 (1997)
(The Coasian insight that it should reduce the costs of transacting was easy to specify, but difficult
to put into operation. The most obvious response was that the rules should take a form which
could be justified by ‘majoritarian’ preference. That is, the default rule should be formulated in a
way which appeals to more parties than any alternative formulation. Thus, contracting costs
would be lower because fewer parties would want to opt out.).
62
Professor Ian Ayres is a lawyer and an economist. He is Deputy Dean and the William K. Townsend
Professor at Yale Law School and a Professor at Yale’s School of Management. Ian Ayres, Our Faculty,
YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/ian-ayres (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
63
Professor Robert Gertner is Joel F. Gemunder Professor of Strategy and Finance; John Edwardson
Faculty Director Rustandy Center for Social Sector Innovation. Robert H. Gertner, Faculty Directory, UNIV.
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[A]s transaction costs increase, so does the parties’ willingness to
accept a default that is not exactly what they would have contracted
for. Scholars who attribute contractual incompleteness to transaction
costs are naturally drawn toward choosing defaults that the majority of
contracting parties ‘would have wanted’ because these majoritarian
defaults seem to minimize the costs of contracting.64

Lawmakers should choose a default rule reflecting the majority’s preference.
It is essential to analyze which dispute settlement mechanism is most desired by
the business community for commercial matters. The optimal default
jurisdiction can be determined by knowing the preferred dispute mechanism.65
In the business community, arbitration is perceived as the most suitable and
dominant method for settlement of commercial disputes.66 Virtually all
commercial disputes are resolved through arbitration.67 The natural order of
things has been reversed. In commercial matters, at least, arbitration is the rule;
and in courts, the exception. Why is it, then, that parties must opt in for a solution
which appears as the most natural one in the community?68
In this regard, Professor Cuniberti has stated that:
It is however, paradoxical that a natural mode for the resolution of any
disputes not be, if not mandatory, which is exceptional in a commercial
context, at least a default solution. In other words, one wonders why,
if arbitration is the natural mode for the resolution of international
commercial disputes, it is not the default solution when the parties
have not provided for the mode of resolution of their disputes and, in
particular, have not included a jurisdiction clause in their contract.69

CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS., https://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/g/robert-h-gertner (last visited Aug. 28,
2020).
64
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 61, at 93.
65
Whincop & Keynes, supra note 58, at 516. Whincop and Keynes describe a default rule as one that “is

supplied by the state to complete an agreement that the parties leave incomplete.” Id. They further explain
that “[a]lthough the default rule influences the form of the parties’ exchange, the adjective ‘default’ emphasizes
that the rule merely supplements agreement; it does not thwart or override it.” Id. Whincop and Keynes
distinguish between a default rule and a mandatory or immutable rule. Id. “The normative thrust of law and
economics research has been the advocacy of default rules, and the rejection of mandatory rules, at least in cases
of bargains between persons of full capacity.” Id. Further, “[d]efault rules can reduce the costs of contracting,
whereas immutable rules increase those costs, if preferences for legal rules are not homogeneous.” Id.
66
FRIEDLAND & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 2, at 2.
67
Id.
68
Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 421.
69
Id. at 419.
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Similarly, Professor Youssef has stated that:
Arbitration’s universal development has brought a serious challenge
to the idea that state justice is the natural judge . . . The frequency of
reference and the enforcement of arbitration even beyond the scope of
formal reference is turning, in fact, arbitral justice into the default
forum of international commerce. The structure of international
jurisdiction theory based on the exceptionalism of private dispute
settlement is being informally altered; and today, arbitration can be
said to ‘prevail by default.’70

It is curious, to say the least, that arbitration is often considered an alternative
mechanism of dispute resolution. The truth is that arbitration has become,
undeniably, the natural mechanism for resolving commercial disputes.71 It is the
rule, and, by definition, the rule cannot be an alternative.72
In this regard, in a survey conducted by Queen Mary University and White
& Case it was expressly stated that:
International arbitration is still the preferred method of resolving
cross-border disputes—with a twist
Previous surveys by Queen Mary University of London have
confirmed that arbitration is by far the preferred dispute resolution
mechanism for cross-border commercial disputes. As was the case
with our previous 2012 and 2015 international arbitration surveys,
private practitioners, full-time arbitrators, in-house counsel, experts
and other stakeholders were invited to complete our questionnaire. An
overwhelming majority of this diverse respondent group (97%)
showed a clear preference for arbitration as their preferred method of
resolving cross-border disputes, either as a stand-alone method (48%)
or in conjunction with ADR (49%).73

70
YOUSSEF, supra note 6, at 39 (citation omitted); see also Born, supra note 13, at 10 (“If one asks
international businessmen or businesswomen how their commercial disputes should be resolved, they say
that they want those disputes resolved neutrally, expertly, efficiently and enforceably. They do not know
the details of how this occurs, but that is their expectation and desire.”).
71

Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 436 (discussing disadvantages of arbitration).
Alfredo Bullard González, Comprando Justicia: ¿Genera el Mercado de Arbitraje Reglas Jurídicas
Predecibles?, 53 THEMIS L.J. 71, 86 (2007) (explaining that today in Peru it is difficult to imagine conflicts of
important commercial contracts that are solved in the judiciary because virtually everything is resolved through
arbitration).
73
FRIEDLAND & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 2, at 5 (emphasis added).
72
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Fig. 2 – International Arbitration: The Status Quo75

74
75

Id. fig. 1.
Id. at 8, fig. 2.
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In the same sense, Varady stated that international commercial arbitration
“has become the dominant method of settling international trade disputes.”76
Additionally, Professors Drahozal and Naimark77 affirmed that 90 percent of
international contracts include an arbitration clause.78 What is more, they also
mentioned that the number of proceedings administered by leading international
institutions doubled between 1993 and 2003, and tripled for the American
Arbitration Association.79
Finally, Lew has affirmed that, “[a] detailed examination of the evidence on
international commercial contracts concludes that around 80 percent of these
contracts had arbitration clauses at the time of his study, for example, and that
over time, ‘more and more [international traders] . . . turn to arbitration.’”80
The rationality behind the economic theory of default rules is precisely to
respond to market demand.81 Then, if it is crystal clear that arbitration is the
preferred dispute mechanism, it should be recognized as the default
jurisdiction.82 This suggests that recognizing arbitration as the default
76
Tibor Varady, On the Option of a Contractual Extension of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Or:
What Is Actually Pro-Arbitration, 56 ZBORNIK PFZ 455, 455 (2006). Professor Tibor Varady is an internationally
recognized scholar and expert on international commercial arbitration, private international law, and
international business transactions. Tibor Varady, Faculty Emeritus, EMORY UNIV. SCH. L., https://law.emory.
edu/faculty/faculty-emeritus/varady-emeritus-profile.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
77
Professor Christopher R. Drahozal is the John M. Rounds Professor of Law at the University of Kansas.
Christopher R. Drahozal, Directory of Distinguished Professors, UNIV. KAN., http://distinguishedprofessors.ku.
edu/professor/drahozal-c (last visited Sept. 7, 2020). Professor Richard Naimark is Senior Vice President of
ICDR Global Operations. Richard W. Naimark, Biography, INT’L CTR. FOR DISP. RESOL.
78
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & RICHARD NAIMARK, TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 59 (Kluwer Law International ed., 2005).
79
Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 233, 233 (2006).
80
Brian L. Benson, 7500 Arbitration: Literature Review, ENCYC. L. & ECON. 159, 159 (1999); JULIAN
LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: A STUDY IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
AWARDS 589 (Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications 1978). Professor Julian Lew is a full-time arbitrator in
international commercial and investment disputes, and is also Professor of International Arbitration and Head of
the School of International Arbitration, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London.
Professor Julian DM Lew, Academic Staff, Queen Mary Univ. London, https://www.qmul.ac.uk/law/people/
academic-staff/items/lew.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
81
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 61, at 91.
82
Graves, supra note 22, at 16–17

(Any suggestion for treatment of arbitration as a ‘default rule’ for dispute resolution raises
obvious and significant questions regarding ‘consent.’ It is often repeated that consent is the
cornerstone of arbitration, and this same ‘consent’ mantra was recently invoked by Professor
Alan Rau in seemingly dismissing the idea of a rule making arbitration the default means of
international commercial dispute resolution as a proposal ‘displaying analytical confusion.’
However, ‘consent’ comes in many forms. An international commercial transaction is always
based on consent, as a matter of universal contract law. The vast majority of contract regimes
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jurisdiction would be the confirmation of a phenomenon that has been
stealthily strengthening for decades. As a matter of fact, arbitration already
works as the default rule.83 Arbitration has already become the “natural mode
of [commercial] dispute resolution.”84
B. Empirical Argument: Evidence That Demonstrates That Consent Is Not
Inherent to Arbitration—the Successful Story of Mandatory Arbitration
The Law of Acquisitions of the Peruvian State has prescribed mandatory
arbitration in disputes that are derived from contracts that the State executes,
either with respect to the acquisition of goods and services or with respect to the
execution and supervision of works.85 Peru is the only country in the world in
which this measure has been adopted.86
Many arguments have been made against this law, for example: the
implementation of a mandatory arbitration system is unconstitutional; the
implementation of a mandatory arbitration system contravenes the contractual

provide a broad array of default terms, typically based on normative business behavior. In one
respect, an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the parties’ main contract is no more
than a typical majoritarian default contract term provided in a variety of contractual contexts.
Admittedly, this is arguably inconsistent with the doctrine of separability, but that doctrine would
be rendered largely unnecessary if arbitration were the default.).
83
Alfredo Bullard González, Justicia Injusta, EL COMERCIO (May 31, 2014), https://elcomercio.pe/
opinion/columnistas/justicia-injusta-alfredo-bullard-325066.
84
Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 421.
85
Law No. 30225 art. 45, para 1, Jan. 2017 (Peru) (“Disputes that arise between the parties regarding the
execution, interpretation, resolution, non-existence, ineffectiveness or invalidity of the contract are resolved
through conciliation or institutional arbitration, in accordance to the agreement of the partiess.”).
86
Jorge Correa et al., Poder Judicial y mercado: ¿Quién debe pagar por la justicia? COLECCIÓN
INFORMES DE INVESTIGACIÓN 32–33 (Apr. 1, 1999) (“In this direction are found, in the case of arbitration,
measures tending to enhance . . . the extension of forced arbitration to all commercial conflicts that exceed a
certain amount, which would be the definitive abandonment of the wrong conception of civil justice as a public
good.”).
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nature of arbitration; or justice is too important to leave justice in the hands of
the market.87 However, no argument is more powerful than the empirical one.88
So far, mandatory arbitration in Peru is a success story.89 This experience
clearly shows that consent is not inherent to arbitration. Peru has gone from a
reality in which the Judicial Power had a sort of monopoly to resolve commercial
disputes (in which arbitration was virtually non-existent) to a reality in which
arbitration has become mandatory for some types of disputes.90
Although the implementation of mandatory arbitration broke the contractual
nature of arbitration, it is undoubtable that the arbitrations filed by virtue of the
Legislative Decree No. 1017, Law of Acquisitions of the State, are still
arbitrations. Historically, some denounced the unconstitutionality of mandatory
arbitration, arguing that arbitration was contractual in nature. Years later,
nevertheless, Peru proved mandatory arbitration to be a great success.91
Although there is room for improvement, this measure has been very useful
to decongest the judicial branch. Therefore, recognizing arbitration as default
jurisdiction would be nothing more than the confirmation of a phenomenon
stealthily configuring for decades. Arbitration functions de facto as the default
rule.
87
See, e.g., IPA–Peruvian Institute of Arbitration, José Daniel Amado, Chairman: IPA’s Biggest
Accomplishment Is Getting People to Unders, LEADERS LEAGUE (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.leadersleague.com/
en/news/ipa-peruvian-institute-of-arbitration-jose-daniel-amado-chairman-ipa-s-biggest-accomplishment-isgetting-people-to-understand-th. Many argue that the mandatory arbitration provided for in this law is
unconstitutional because it violates the contractual nature of arbitration. E.g., Alfredo de Jesus O., Autonomia
del Arbitraje Comercial Internacional a la Hora de la Constitucionalizacion del Arbitraje en America Latina, 4
REV. BRAS. ARB. 45 (2008). This is wrong. This phenomenon, which happened in an absolutely unnoticed
manner, occurred spontaneously and praxeologically. Arbitration in disputes with the State may have been
envisaged by law, but this was the response to a market demand. See Alexandra Molina Dimitrijevich,
Arbitration as a Dispute-Solving Mechanism in Public Procurement: A Comparative View Between Peruvian
and Spanish Systems, 4 INT’L PUB. PROCUREMENT CONF., 1–20 (2010); see also Paul McMahon, Nature of
Arbitration, MCMAHON LEGAL (2018), http://mcmahonsolicitors.ie/nature-of-arbitration/. Many have argued
that the mandatory arbitration provided for in this law is unconstitutional because it violates the contractual
nature of arbitration. This is wrong. All this evolution, which has happened in an absolutely unnoticed manner,
has occurred spontaneously and praxeologically. Arbitration in disputes with the State may have been envisaged
by law, but this was the response to a market demand.
88
See generally Elina Mereminskaya and Claudio Inostroza, Corruption in State Arbitration in the
Republic of Peru: Cases, Lessons and Possible Solutions, ARB. J. (Mar. 14, 2020), https://journal.
arbitration.ru/analytics/corruption-in-state-arbitration-in-the-republic-of-peru-cases-lessons-and-possiblesolutions-/.
89
Alfredo Bullard, Perú: El Arbitraje Peruano es una Historia de éxito, EL COMERCIO (Aug. 22, 2015),
https://www.elcato.org/peru-el-arbitraje-peruano-es-una-historia-de-exito.
90
Mario Castillo Freyre & Rita Sabroso Minaya, Arbitraje Obligatorio y de Derecho en la Contratación
Pública, REVISTA OFICIAL DEL PODER JUDICIAL 237, 241 (2009).
91
Bullard, supra note 89.
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C. Axiological Argument: Arbitration Must Be Recognized as the Default
Jurisdiction Because This System Would Be More Compatible with Party
Autonomy
The choice of the default rule should not be viewed exclusively from an
economic perspective. It should not only be the one that the majority wants, but
also one that is more compatible with party autonomy. Under the rule of law, the
freedom of individuals is the rule; and its restriction, the exception.
Consequently, the default rule should always maximize party autonomy. As will
be further analyzed, arbitration maximizes party autonomy, which implies that
it should be chosen as the default jurisdiction.
One could argue that this is an ideologized argument without practical
impact. Quite the opposite. The fact that the legislature restricted party
autonomy by recognizing state justice as the default jurisdiction directly affects
humans of flesh and blood. In effect, this argument seeks to demonstrate that the
constructivist design of completely artificial procedures has violated, not only
freedom and party autonomy, but many fundamental rights of human beings.
1. A Case to Illustrate the Problem
Imagine a very complex torts case. The company Quick Buildings LLC
(Quick Buildings) builds a big complex in six months at the request of a
prestigious law firm. Before the inauguration of the new office, the building
collapses, causing serious damage to the adjacent building in which the company
Diamonds LLC (Diamonds), the subsidiary of a French transnational gemstone
company, operates. The accident destroyed everything. The resulting damages
incurred by Diamonds were valued in the millions.
Diamonds proposed to resolve the dispute with Quick Buildings through
arbitration. However, Quick Buildings—knowing arbitration would force
payment of millions in compensation in a very short period of time—refused
and expressed that, since they did not have an arbitration agreement, they would
resolve their dispute in court. Quick Buildings unwillingness to arbitrate
negatively impacted the administrators of Diamonds. From one day to the next,
Diamonds business in Peru was destroyed. Additionally, their lawyers told them
that, at best, the trial before courts could last five years and, although it was
evident that the law was on their side, anything could happen in the Peruvian
judicial system.
Diamonds’ lawyers also explained that since the other party refused to
resolve the dispute through arbitration, Diamonds would not be able to appoint
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its own arbitrator. At first, the administrators of Diamonds did not think that this
was a big deal because they thought that in Peru—as in many other countries—
judges were highly specialized persons with unblemished ethics. Their
disappointment was enormous when their lawyers told them Peruvian judges
were—with a few exceptions—exactly the opposite, and dramatically so. When
they reviewed the corruption indexes of the Peruvian judiciary and noticed how
poorly prepared the judges were, they realized how serious not being entitled to
choose their own arbitrator was. The state stole that freedom.
The worst part was when the administrators of Diamonds told their lawyers
they would like to agree with the other party on how the procedure was designed.
They told their lawyers that since the controversy was extremely complex, it was
essential for them to have at least ninety days to prepare pleadings; to have a
second round of pleadings; to include a document production phase in the
proceedings; to be able to submit a pre-hearing brief in which the expert reports
could be analyzed; to have a hearing that can last at least two weeks; and to agree
on the deadline for the judge to render their judgment.
The lawyers sadly told them that all this was impossible because the
Peruvian Civil Procedure Act already designed a mandatory procedure that was
fully applicable to the present case (and, in fact, to thousands more).
Accordingly, Diamonds was told that both parties would have thirty days to
submit their pleadings (no more no less); that it would be impossible to have two
rounds of pleadings; that it would be impossible to include a document
production phase; that it would not be possible for them to submit a pre-hearing
brief; and that it was impossible for the parties to determine the deadline of the
court to render its judgment.
The administrators of Diamonds were astonished. They did not understand
why the state arrogantly decided to design a procedure instead of recognizing
the right of the parties to do so in a private dispute. They wondered: Why did
Diamonds need the consent of Quick Buildings to resolve the dispute in an
arbitration? Wasn’t freedom the rule in a state in which the rule of law prevails?
If so, shouldn’t the state recognize the freedom of the parties to appoint their
own arbitrators and the freedom to tailor their own procedure as the default
rules?
By recognizing state justice as the default rule—and, consequently, the
contractual foundation of arbitration—party autonomy has been established as
an exception. The freedoms to designate their arbitrators and to design their own
procedure are only possible if both parties so agree. But what if one of the parties
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refuses to agree on arbitration? Then they will have to resolve the controversy
in an inefficient, unpredictable, and usually corrupt judiciary.
Without any explanation it has been concluded that the state is in a better
position than the parties to decide who will resolve their dispute and to determine
how the procedures should be designed. This is once again, as Hayek suggests,
an example of fatal conceit of the state.92
2. The Recognition of the Contractual Foundation of Arbitration Is a
Constructivist Phenomenon
Arguing that state justice must be the default jurisdiction, and arbitration the
exception, implies that the state knows better than the parties regarding who
should resolve their disputes and how they should be resolved. This is especially
true if it is a private dispute that only affects the parties.93 As previously argued,
the default rule must be the one that is most compatible with freedom and,
consequently, with party autonomy.
The worst consequence is that often the decisions of the state have been
absolutely arbitrary. The Peruvian state designed a constructivist system that
lacks rationality. The following questions illustrate these issues: What is the
legitimacy of the legislature to establish that in all trials exceeding a certain
amount the parties must necessarily have ten or thirty days to answer or
counterclaim?94 What happens if those deadlines are not enough for an effective
exercise of the right of defense? It seems that this does not matter because it is
assumed the legislature knows better than the parties what their deadline should
be.95
Other questions arise: what is the rationality of the Peruvian Civil Procedural
Act to grant parties only five or ten days to submit jurisdictional defenses?96 This
is a completely irrational deadline, considering parties can have a very complex
problem of competence or lack of legal standing. If both parties agree to have a
longer deadline to submit their pleadings, why should they not be entitled to it
when the final decision will only affect them? The answer is unclear. The only
92
See generally FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 33
(Routledge 1988).
93
See generally Alfredo Bullard González, ¿Qué es un Socialista?, EL COMERCIO PERÚ NEWS (Apr. 9,
2016), https://elcomercio.pe/opinion/columnistas/socialista-alfredo-bullard-184523-noticia/.
94
CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT [CPA] art. 478 § 5, art. 491 § 5 (Peru).
95
See FERNANDO CANTUARIAS SALAVERRY, ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL Y DE INVERSIONES 131–32 n.82
(Fondo Editorial de la UPC 2007).
96
CPA art. 478 § 3, art. 491 § 3.
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thing that is clear is that the state, once more, arrogantly decided what was best
for the parties.
Since it is simply impossible to tailor the myriad of procedures that the
parties could wish for, the legislature created a few procedures which the parties
must adapt to. It is an incredible situation in which the parties are the ones that
need to adapt to the procedures, and not the procedures that need to adapt to the
expectations of the parties. It is an upside-down world.97
But that is not all. For example, the Peruvian Civil Procedural Act
established that the representative of a company cannot appear as a witness in a
trial.98 This means, for example, that the administrator of a construction project
cannot testify as a witness in a Peruvian trial because the legislature believes
that, since the administrator has an alleged interest in the outcome of the trial,
his version of the facts cannot be reliable. Nevertheless, what if he is the only
person able to exhaustively explain the breaches of the other party? It seems that
this did not matter to the legislature. Since the administrator of the construction
project could be biased, the legislature paternalistically decided he or she cannot
testify. But shouldn’t this person be allowed to testify and then give the judge
the power to decide if the testimony is reliable? Since the legislature arrogantly
concluded that the judge was not acute enough to comply this task, it decided to
prohibit the admissibility of such testimony.
What is more, the Peruvian legislature also established that each party can
only submit six witness statements with their pleadings.99 Nevertheless, what
happens if one party is accusing the other of more than ten breaches in the
framework of a construction contract and needs more than ten witnesses to
demonstrate each of the breaches? Shouldn’t the party be entitled to do so? Isn’t
it a violation of due process to restrict his right to submit relevant evidence?
These are the problems of designing a constructivist procedure.
The Peruvian Procedural Civil Act is full of irrational rules in which the
legislature believed it knew better than the parties what was best for them. The
truth, however, is that the legislature was not in a good position to create all the
appropriate procedures to satisfy the expectations of the parties because no one
is intelligent enough to do it.100
97
EnfoqueDerecho, #SemanaDelArbitrajeInternacional Jesús Remón sobre las ventajas del arbitraje,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SS7vhxxHr-A (view 07:07–08:21) (Enfoque
Derecho conducted an interview of Jesús Remón Peñalver during International Arbitration Week).
98
CPA art. 229 §4.
99
CPA art. 226.
100
FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL
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In Hayek’s words:
Concerning our modern economic system, understanding of the
principles by which its order forms itself shows us that it rests on the
use of knowledge (and of skills in obtaining relevant information)
which no one possesses in its entirety, and that it is brought about
because individuals are in their actions guided by certain general
rules.101

Hayek also points out in The Use of Knowledge in Society, that knowledge
is dispersed among thousands of individuals.102 Hence, lawmakers should not be
expected to know how procedures should be designed to meet the needs of the
parties. It would be an impossible task because they would have to contemplate
thousands of procedures in the Procedural Acts, which is irrational. Depending
on the circumstances of each case, the parties will design their procedures in a
certain way.
Even if it were suggested that different procedures should be included in the
Procedural Civil Act, which is not a practical suggestion, lawmakers are not able
to store the information that would allow them to design such an infinite number
of procedures. Hayek explains that “we ought not to succumb to the false belief,
or delusion, that we can replace it with a different kind of order, which
presupposes that all this knowledge can be concentrated in a central brain, or
group of brains of any practicable size.”103 Professor Ferrero suggests that
“[t]here seems to be only one solution for this problem: that the elite of mankind
acquire consciousness of the limitation of the human mind[.]”104
The biggest problem arises when the design itself ends up violating the due
process of the parties. Some years ago, Professor Fernando Cantuarias, former
Dean of the Universidad del Pacífico, told a curious anecdote in a class that
illustrates this problem very well. He stated that one day he got a call from the

PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 32 (Routledge 2013).
101
FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND HISTORY OF
IDEAS 13 (Routledge & Kegan Paul London and Henley, vol.1, 1978) [hereinafter NEW STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY].
102
Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945)
[hereinafter The Use of Knowledge in Society].
103
NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 101, at 13.
104
GUGLIELMO FERRERO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POWER: THE GREAT POLITICAL CRISES OF HISTORY 318
(G.P. Putnam’s sons 1942). Professor Guglielmo Ferrero was an Italian historian, journalist and novelist, author
of the Greatness and Decline of Rome. Ferrero devoted his writings to classical liberalism and he opposed any
kind of dictatorship and unlimited government. He was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature twenty times
in six years. Guglielmo Ferrero, People, PEOPLEPILL, https://peoplepill.com/people/guglielmo-ferrero/ (last
visited Sept. 7, 2020).
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Jorge Chávez Airport informing him that a large number of packages arrived for
him. Due to the amount of packages, customs decided to retain them. Maybe
with the intention of exaggerating the anecdote a little—and making it more
pleasant—Professor Cantuarias said that the number of packages that had
arrived could almost fill an entire room. Professor Cantuarias was bewildered
when he received the call. He was not expecting a package. Great was his
surprise when he discovered that it was not a gift; it was a request for arbitration
accompanied by all the exhibits. There were thousands upon thousands of
documents. It was, certainly, a very complex controversy. When the parties
negotiated the terms of the first procedural order, they quickly agreed that it was
reasonable for each party to have four months to draft their pleadings.
What would have happened if, in a controversy like this one, the parties had
not included an arbitration agreement in their contract? The result would have
been chaotic. Since the parties would not have had the freedom to design their
own arbitral procedure, the claimant would have had all the time he would have
wished to prepare his pleading, revise the witness statements and expert reports,
and select the documentation that he would like to offer as evidence. This means
that if he had needed six months or a year to prepare his pleading, he could have
spent that time without a problem. The claimant can have as much time as they
want because their claim is not time-barred. Since the request for arbitration does
not exist in a trial, the defendant is destined to receive claimant’s pleading and
the thousand attachments without prior notice. Unlike the American court
system, Peru does not take part in discovery. The defendant receives the pleading
and has a deadline of thirty days to answer all the claimant’s arguments.
Imagine defendants in a Peruvian trial are notified of the pleading along with
thousands of documents, witness statements, and expert reports. They need
several months to study the pleadings and exhibits and hire a law firm that can
design an effective defense. Nevertheless, the Peruvian legislature believed that
even in a case like this, thirty days was enough. This undoubtedly constitutes a
flagrant violation of the defendant’s right of defense. The worst part being, it is
not the claimant or the judge who is violating defendant’s right of defense—it is
the system itself. This is because the legal system is forcing the defendant to
answer a pleading of hundreds of pages along with thousands of appendixes in
only thirty days.
It is unbelievable that the legislature grants the claimant six months to a year
to prepare its pleading and then restricts a defendant’s deadline to submit its
pleading to thirty days. In fact, the violation of the right of defense is so serious
that it is difficult for a lawyer to accept the case. This is because it is materially
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impossible for a lawyer to perform their work with diligence in such a short and
constraining deadline.
The anecdote described by Professor Cantuarias reflects how serious it is
that it is the State that designs the procedures and takes away this freedom from
the parties. It is the parties who are in the best position to determine how their
procedure should be tailored.
In an arbitral procedure this would never occur. Arbitration constitutes a
maximum guarantee that both parties will be treated with absolute equality. This
is something that arbitrators take very seriously. In effect, Article 18 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law states that “the parties shall be treated with equality
and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case.”105
As Bullard explains:
And the data does not lie: in countries where arbitration has flexibility,
pragmatism and simplicity by appropriate laws, it is flourishing,
suffocating the heavy and rhetorical procedural law unable to deal with
commercial disputes. It would do the same in other areas if the law
released its competitive force. Today in Peru it is difficult to imagine
conflicts of important commercial contracts that are solved in the
judiciary. Virtually everything is resolved through arbitration.106

The diversity of procedures that can be designed in arbitration is a
phenomenon that occurs in a praxeological way.107 The thousands of parties who
participate in arbitrations every day are the only ones who are in a privileged
position to design the myriad of procedures that may be necessary to meet their
expectations. If legislators take away the freedom to design unique procedures,
parties to an arbitration will be frustrated because the existing procedures may
not satisfy their needs.
But that is not all. The rule, imposed by the State, is that in commercial
disputes, it will be a third party poorly prepared, unspecialized, frequently
unreliable and with an excessive burden of files, who will be competent to
resolve the dispute with res judicata effects. This is the case unless both parties
include an arbitration agreement in their contract and submit their dispute to
arbitration. Consequently, the parties would also be deprived of the freedom to
choose a person in whom they trust for the resolution of their private dispute.
105

UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON INT’L COM. ARB., at 14, U.N. Doc. Sales No. E.08.V.4. (2008).
Bullard, supra note 68, at 86 (translated by author).
107
Marco de Benito & Sonsoles Huerta de Soto, El Arbitraje Internacional como Orden Jurídico
Espontáneo, 22 REVISTA DEL CLUB ESPAÑOL DE ARBITRAJE 113, 125–26 (2015).
106
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As explained by Correa:
Among other conflict resolution systems—which operate as substitute
goods of adversarial systems of state origin—, they show alternative
costs manifestly inferior to those of the judicial system. This is
explained by the greater flexibility they present. In these procedures it
is possible to adapt the procedures to the characteristics of the specific
case. They also allow the third party that resolves the conflict to be a
person specialized in the matter on which it is based. In contrast, the
judicial system is, by definition, rigid. The independence that judges
must have and the procedural guarantees of trials force to structure the
organization and the procedures in a way that is even more heavy and
formal than that which is commonly presented by the administration
of justice. We find ourselves, in this case, with judges who are
immovable for life, with convoluted systems of appointment and
promotion. Additionally, the guarantees that must be offered to the
parties lead to the elimination of margins of discretion, which means
that they have to apply procedures that are more in line with the more
complex and exceptional case than the general.108

These defects are directly imputable to the contractual foundation of
arbitration. It is terrible that contractual arbitration has been associated with a
liberal system. The truth is that the contractual foundation of arbitration is a
constructivist phenomenon.
It can be argued that if the parties do not like this constructivist system
designed by the state, they can always resort to arbitration. But that is not the
problem. The problem is in a state where the rule of law prevails, the default rule
must maximize freedom. Arbitration maximizes party autonomy.

108
Correa et al., supra note 86, at 32 (translated by author); accord MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW
LIBERTY, THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO 277 (Ludwig Von Mises Institute, 2d ed. 2006). Rothbard proposes that
“[w]e should all be more familiar with the increasingly frequent use of private arbitration, even in our present
society.” Id. He further explains that “[t]he government courts have become so clogged, inefficient, and wasteful
that more and more parties to disputes are turning to private arbitrators as a cheaper and far less time-consuming
way of settling their disputes.” Id. Rothbard describes changes to private arbitration in recent years as “a growing
and highly successful profession.” Id. Further, “[b]eing voluntary, furthermore, the rules of arbitration can be
decided rapidly by the parties themselves, without the need for a ponderous, complex legal framework applicable
to all citizens. Arbitration therefore permits judgments to be made by people expert in the trade or occupation
concerned.” Id.
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IV. PROPOSAL: ARBITRATION SHOULD BE THE DEFAULT JURISDICTION
A. What Does It Imply That Arbitration Is the Default Jurisdiction?
At least in arbitrable disputes, arbitration must be the default jurisdiction.109
Through this measure, a property regime based on contractual justice would be
introduced in which each litigant would internalize the costs derived from the
resolution of his disputes.110
Recognizing arbitration as the default jurisdiction implies eliminating the
contractual nature of arbitration.111 It is not intended, however, to shift the rule
and propose for arbitration to become an “opt out.” Under the proposed model,
the existence of an arbitration agreement is not implicitly presumed when two
parties enter a contract. Quite the contrary; now arbitration will be the natural
resolution mechanism of commercial disputes, which implies that arbitration
loses its contractual foundation and becomes the default mode of dispute
resolution.112
By proposing that arbitration should be the default jurisdiction, in the face
of a commercial controversy—whether contractual, real-state, or torts—a party
can file an arbitration against whoever they want without proving the existence
of consent (even if respondent is not a party of the contract). Under the proposed
model, what would have a contractual nature would be the access to public
courts.
In this regard, Professor Graves has suggested that:
Instead of attempting to weave an ever tighter torpedo net against a
contrary default mechanism for resolving international commercial
disputes in court, why not simply recognize the obvious and make
arbitration the default? With a default rule providing for arbitration, a

109
Bruce L. Hay, Christopher Rendall-Jackson & David Rosenberg, Litigating BP’s Contribution Claims
in Publicly Subsidized Courts: Should Contracting Parties Pay Their Own Way?, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1919, 1924
(2011). The article states that “[a]lthough litigation in the court system obviously is not free to the parties, the
public still bears a substantial amount of the costs of adjudication.” Id. The article details that a prominent cost
“is the time that public officers devote to adjudication—time that the parties do not pay for and that the officials
could have spent on other cases if the parties had opted for a private alternative.” Id.
110
Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of Litigation? 34 CATH.
U. L. REV. 267, 269–71 (1985).
111
Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 422 (stating that “[i]n the model that I propose, however, arbitration loses
its contractual foundation[]”).
112
Id. at 451 (arguing that “[T]he question which this Section seeks to answer is whether, as a matter of
theory, it is conceivable to resort to arbitration in the absence of an agreement of the parties to that effect. The
answer is yes.”).
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court would have no basis for exercising jurisdiction absent an
affirmative agreement of the parties. Thus, the effectiveness of court
actions as a means to delay or obstruct arbitration proceedings would
be substantially diminished, if not largely eliminated.113

By eliminating the contractual nature of arbitration, several positive
externalities would be created: (i) all irresolvable discussions regarding arbitral
consent would be overcome; (ii) one would no longer have to invent absolutely
convoluted non-signatory theories to create consents; (iii) the endless
discussions regarding the objective scope of the arbitration agreement would not
be necessary; (iv) it would no longer be disputed whether the arbitration clause
is broad or restricted; (v) the cases of pathological arbitration clauses would be
significantly reduced. Everything would be much simpler, generating a direct
impact on the peaceful settlement of disputes.114
B. Consequences of Recognizing Arbitration as the Default Jurisdiction
In summary, it is possible to brush up the following benefits that will be
derived directly from the recognition of arbitration as the default jurisdiction:
a) There would no longer be a risk of contradictory and unenforceable
awards;
b) All commercial disputes, including torts and real-estate, would be
settled through arbitration;
c) Courts would be decongested because all commercial disputes
would be resolved through arbitration;
d) Courts would no longer be infested with a tragedy of the commons,
and the free-riding problem would disappear;
e) All the problems derived from the contractual foundation of
arbitration would be eliminated, which would create a much more
effective and consistent system;

113

Graves, supra note 22, at 14–15.
Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 484. Cuniberti states that “[w]hile most of the rules existing in the
traditional model could be kept in the proposed model, certain rules of international arbitration are direct
consequences of the contractual foundation of the traditional model.” Id. Cuniberti further explains that
“arbitration raises a variety of issues in respect of third parties, who can neither be joined, nor intervene in the
proceedings because they are not parties to the arbitration agreement.” Id. Many rules “are widely perceived as
limiting the efficacy of the arbitral process, and as such as necessary evils.” Id. “One of the best examples is
precisely the rule preventing joinder of third parties absent the agreement of all parties concerned. In practice,
this has most often meant that arbitration could not cope properly with multi-party disputes.” Id. Cuniberti further
argues that “modifying the rule and allowing arbitration to deal more efficiently with multi-party disputes would
not be regretted by many. The new paradigm would actually lead to an improvement of the arbitral process.” Id.
at 484–85.
114
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f)

Litigants would internalize the costs of their disputes, as well as the
social costs they create in society;
g) Public resources would be saved because commercial justice would
no longer be subsidized by citizens’ taxes.115
In the words of Professor Graves:
With a default arbitration regime for dispute resolution . . . the issues
of lis pendens and the potential for parallel proceedings virtually
disappear. . . . As an additional benefit, a default arbitration regime
would solve many of the existing challenges related to joinder of
parties. Absent an agreement to the contrary, all parties to a given
transaction or occurrence could effectively be joined in a single
arbitration proceeding. This would arguably go a long way towards
resolving a significant problem with the existing arbitration regime
based solely on express consent.116

The benefits generated by the proposal of arbitration as the default
jurisdiction confirms that it should be implemented sooner rather than later. We
do not need to create more courts, appoint new judges, expand their
competences, or create new specialties. We need proposals that break the mold.
The default arbitration is an outside-the-box proposal that directly attacks the
core of the problem.
CONCLUSION
This Article questions a paradigm that history has treated as a dogma. The
picture is clear: the questioning of the contractual foundation of arbitration will
not cease. Over time it will be increasingly obvious that non-consensual
arbitration is more efficient.
Once upon a time, arbitration was seen as a means of avoiding courts in
resolving parties’ contract disputes. That story has ended. Arbitration is no

115
See generally Cuniberti, supra note 23, at 428–29. Cuniberti argues the issues from the perspective of
the State are different, arguing that “[a]rbitration is a private mode of dispute resolution, which is entirely
funded by the litigants. As a result, it obviously saves public resources.” Id. Further, “[a]rbitral tribunals
decide disputes which would have otherwise been decided by courts. In many jurisdictions, public resources are
scarce. Policies which entail public resources savings are therefore likely to be particularly appreciated by
policymakers. Id. RETHINKING, supra note 5, at 185 (stating that “A model of default arbitration could also serve
the purpose of reducing the caseload of the public court system and thus allow the States which would want to
follow this path to better use the resources that they allocate to fund civil justice.”).
116
Graves, supra note 22, at 20–21.
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longer a substitute nor an alternative mechanism; it is the natural and preferred
mechanism for resolving commercial disputes.117
The only objection to the default arbitration proposal for domestic disputes
is the fear of the unknown. As Gary Born suggests, the law exists in a particular
construct according to a particular set of rules. The foundation of arbitration is
consent. The default arbitration proposal is innovative; it breaks the mold. But
we ought not forget that one hundred years ago the New York Convention would
have been regarded similarly, and that forty years ago BITs were as well. They
too were bold innovations that were, in a sense, ahead of their time. But they
proved to be remarkably successful and are now parts of the orthodox legal
environment.118
The fact that the default arbitration proposal is new and unorthodox does not
mean that it lacks merit and cannot be achieved. So, let us put that fear-induced
objection away and think instead about what might be, what could be, and how
to make it happen.119
The fact that arbitration will stop being considered as an exotic exception to
become the rule of a satisfactory justice is something proper to the future.
Arbitration is the natural mechanism for resolving disputes; its recognition as
the default jurisdiction will arrive sooner or later.
Winston Churchill famously observed that democracy was “the worst form
of Government[,] except all those other forms that have been tried from time to
time.”120 I would suggest that default arbitration, with all its imperfections, “is
the worst system of resolving” commercial disputes, “. . .except for all the
others.”121 In the world in which we live, default arbitration has arrived, and has
arrived to be implemented.
* * *

117

Id. at 113.
Born, supra note 13, at 13–14.
119
Id.
120
Winston Churchill, Address to House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947).
121
W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 45 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2015).
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